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Abstract
This paper studies market competition when ﬁrms can inﬂuence consumers’
ability to compare market alternatives, through their choice of price “formats”.
We introduce random graphs as a tool for modeling limited comparability of
formats. Our main results concern the interaction between ﬁrms’ equilibrium
price and format decisions and its implications for industry proﬁts and consumer
switching rates. In particular, ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀs in symmetric equilib-
ria if and only if the graph that represents the comparability between formats
satisﬁes a generalized regularity property, which we interpret as a form of “frame
neutrality”. The same property is necessary for equilibrium behavior to display
statistical independence between price and format decisions. We also show that
narrow regulatory interventions that aim to facilitate comparisons may have an
anti-competitive eﬀect.
1 Introduction
Standard models of market competition assume that consumers rank all the alternatives
they are aware of. The ranking may reﬂect informational constraints, but is complete
nonetheless. In reality, consumers are often unable to compare alternatives. Moreover,
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1whether consumers are able to make comparisons often depends on how alternatives
are described, or “framed”:
• Prices and quantities may be stated in units of measurement that consumers ﬁnd
diﬃcult to discern. For example, the repayment structure of a loan can be deﬁned
in terms of various time units. Interest on a bank deposit can be presented in
various forms. And nutritional contents of a food product can be speciﬁed for
various units of weight or volume.
• Price schedules in certain industries contain a large number of contingencies. For
instance, a fee structure for banking services speciﬁes diﬀerent fees for diﬀerent
classes of transactions. Similarly, a calling plan conditions rates on the destina-
tion, according to some classiﬁcation of all possible destinations. Price schedules
adopted by diﬀerent ﬁrms are often based on diﬀerent categories, with partly
overlapping sections that further complicate the task of comparing them.1
Marketers and regulators alike have long recognized the importance of comparability
for market competition. Nutritional information on food product labels is required to
conform to rigid formats which include standardized units of measurement.2 As to
the regulation of retail ﬁnancial services, the following quotes from recent consumer
protection reports are representative of the views of regulators:
“The possibility to switch providers is essential for consumers to obtain
the best deal. However, the Consumer Market Scoreboard 2009 showed
that only 9% of consumers had switched current bank account during the
previous two years. The causes again relate among others to diﬃculties to
compare oﬀers on banking services...” (EC (2009), p. 4)
“In order to achieve the aims of comparable and comprehensible product
information, the Commission approach has been, for some products and ser-
vices...to promote the standardization of pre-contractual information oblig-
ations within carefully designed and tested formats...” (EC (2009), p. 10)
1Of course, diﬀerent classiﬁcations partly reﬂect diﬀerences in the cost structure and distribution of
consumer preferences that the ﬁrms face. However, they have the additional consequence of hindering
comparisons.
2See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nutrition_facts_label.
2“When deciding whether to switch to another bank, consumers need clear
readily available information that they can understand, as well as the ﬁnan-
cial capability and desire to evaluate it. Ease of comparison will be aﬀected
by the structure of current account pricing. The ease with which consumers
are able to compare current accounts is likely to aﬀect their desire to do so
and thus feed through to the competitive pressures that banks face.” (OFT
(2008), p. 89)
This paper develops a model of market competition under limited comparability. In
our model, ﬁrms choose both how to price their product and how to frame pricing, so
that consumers’ “ease of comparison” is a function of the ﬁrms’ framing decisions. Our
aim is to address in an abstract, theoretical fashion, the following questions: What
are the implications of limited comparability for the competitiveness of the market
outcome? How do regulatory interventions aimed at enhancing comparability perform
when ﬁrms respond strategically to these interventions? What is the interplay between
the ﬁrms’ pricing and framing decisions? Does greater comparability enhance the
consumer’s propensity to switch products?
Our model takes textbook Bertrand competition as a starting point, and adds a
notion of comparability as a new dimension. Two proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms facing a
single consumer produce perfect substitutes at zero cost. They play a simultaneous-
move game in which each ﬁrm i chooses a price pi and a pricing structure xi for its
product, referred to as a format. The price is the actual payment the consumer makes
to the chosen ﬁrm, whereas the format is the way in which the price is presented to the
consumer. The consumer has a unit demand and a reservation value that is identical
for both ﬁrms, regardless of their format decisions. Given the ﬁrms’ price and format
decisions, the consumer chooses as follows. He is initially assigned to one ﬁrm at
random, say ﬁrm 1. We interpret the consumer’s initial ﬁrm assignment as a default
option arising from previous consumption decisions. With probability π(x1,x 2),t h e
consumer makes a price comparison and chooses the rival ﬁrm’s product if strictly
cheaper. Otherwise, he buys from ﬁrm 1.N o t et h a t ,w h e nπ(x,y)=1for all formats
x,y, comparability is perfect and the model collapses to Bertrand competition. When
π(x,y)=π(y,x) for all formats x,y -ap r o p e r t yw ed u b“ order independence”-p r i c e
comparisons are independent of the order in which the consumer considers alternatives.
The consumer’s decision procedure exhibits prudence, or “inertia”. Whenever the
consumer is unable to compare his default option to a new alternative, he chooses the
former. Consequently, when the consumer is initially assigned to ﬁrm i, he selects it
3with probability one when pj ≥ pi and with probability 1−π(xi,x j) when pj <p i.T h i s
bias is consistent with the notion that consumers who face complex decision problems
are likely to fall back on a default option, if they have one. This casual observation
has received experimental support (see, for example, Iyengar and Lepper (2000) and
Choi, Laibson and Madrian (2009)), and is consistent with the above-cited consumer
protection reports, which emphasize inertia driven by limited comparability as a major
cause of low switching rates and weak competitive forces in some industries.
We represent the comparability structure π as a random graph, where the set of
nodes corresponds to the set of formats, and π(x,y) is the probability of a directed
link from node x to node y. A link from format x to format y means that y is easy
to compare to x. The graph representation entails no loss of generality: its role is to
visualize comparability structures that involve many formats, suggest fruitful notions
of comparability and simplify the exposition of results. By allowing the graph to be
probabilistic, we capture heterogeneity among consumers, in that π(x,y) can be viewed
as the ﬁrms’ (common) belief over the consumer’s ability to compare y to x.
1.1 An Illustrative Example: “Star” Graphs
We use a simple example to illustrate the model and some of the main insights. Con-
sider a product that can be priced in m+1diﬀerent currencies, one major and m minor
ones. The consumer is able to compare prices denominated in diﬀerent currencies only
if he knows the exchange rate. Let q be the probability that the consumer knows the
exchange rate between the major currency and any minor one. For simplicity, assume
that the consumer does not know the exchange rates between the minor currencies.
The resulting comparability structure can be represented as a “star” graph, such as







A star graph has one “core” node, representing prices denominated in the major
4currency, and m “peripheral” nodes (m =4in Figure 1) representing prices denom-
inated in a minor currency. Every node is linked to itself with probability one. In
addition, the core node is linked to each of the “peripheral” nodes with probability
q ∈ (0,1).3
The star graph admits no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. On one hand, a perfectly
competitive outcome with zero proﬁts is inconsistent with equilibrium because when a
ﬁrm charges a price p>0 and randomizes over all peripheral formats, it ensures that,
with positive probability, the consumer will fail to make a price comparison. On the
other hand, a non-competitive outcome is inconsistent with pure-strategy equilibrium
by a standard undercutting argument. Since every format is perfectly comparable to
itself, a ﬁrm can always mimic its opponent’s format and slightly undercut its price.
Thus, equilibrium strategies are necessarily mixtures over price-format pairs, reﬂecting
a dispersion of prices and formats in the market.
The symmetric mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium is unique. When mq > 1,t h e
ﬁrms’ price and format decisions are correlated. Speciﬁcally, there exists a cutoﬀ price
pm, such that ﬁrms adopt the core format with probability one conditional on charging
ap r i c eb e l o wpm,a n dﬁrms randomize uniformly over all peripheral formats conditional
on charging a price above pm. In contrast, when mq ≤ 1,t h eﬁrms’ pricing decisions
are identical across formats.
The equilibrium structure’s dependence on the core format’s expected number of
links is not a coincidence. When mq > 1, the core format dominates peripheral formats
in terms of comparability, in that adopting it leads to a higher comparison probability
regardless of the rival ﬁrm’s format decision. Therefore, a cheap (expensive) ﬁrm has
a clear-cut incentive to adopt the core (periphery) as a format strategy. In contrast,
when mq < 1, each format can induce a higher probability of a price comparison,
depending on the rival ﬁrm’s format strategy. Notably, the equilibrium format strategy
λ
∗ equalizes the probability of price comparison across formats. As a result, ﬁrms are
indiﬀerent among all formats, which explains why statistical independence between the
ﬁrms’ price and format decisions is consistent with equilibrium behavior.
The equilibria in these two regions also diﬀer in terms of industry proﬁts. When
gauging the competitiveness of a market outcome, our benchmark is max-min proﬁts:
each ﬁrm earns the minimal proﬁt consistent with consumers’ bounded rationality and
3In this paper, diagrams that represent order-independent graphs are drawn as non-directed graphs
and not as directed graphs with symmetric link probabilities. The diﬀerence is that in the latter, the
link between x and y is realized independently of the link between y and x, whereas in the former
they are realized simultaneously. The two are payoﬀ-equivalent for ﬁrms. In addition, throughout the
paper, diagrams suppress self-links.
5ﬁrms’ individual rationality. Max-min payoﬀs can thus be regarded as “constrained
competitive proﬁts”. When mq > 1, ﬁrms earn equilibrium proﬁts above the max-min
level. To see why, recall that when ﬁrm 1 charges the highest price in the equilibrium
distribution, it adopts a peripheral format to minimize comparability. For ﬁrm 2 to
act as competitively as possible (so as to push ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ to the max-min level), it
should adopt the core format, which maximizes comparability. In equilibrium, however,
whenever ﬁrm 2 c h a r g e sap r i c ea b o v et h ec u t o ﬀ pm, it adopts the less comparable,
peripheral formats, thus lowering the overall probability of price comparison and giving
ﬁrm 1 additional market power which yields proﬁts in excess of the max-min level. In
contrast, when mq ≤ 1, equilibrium proﬁts are at the max-min level, by a straight-
forward application of the Minimax Theorem. The fact that the equilibrium format
strategy λ
∗ induces a constant comparison probability implies that λ
∗ max-minimizes
the probability of a price comparison. As a result, when a ﬁrm charges the highest price
in the equilibrium distribution (which is equal to the consumer’s reservation value), it
earns max-min proﬁts.
The theoretical implications of the equilibrium analysis for market regulation are
somewhat surprising. Current regulatory practice seeks to minimize the number of
formats and harmonize them. In the case of the star graph, industry proﬁts and ex-
pected prices increase with m and decrease with q. This is consistent with the intuition
that simplifying comparison is beneﬁcial for consumer welfare. As to harmonization,
suppose that initially, instead of a single major currency there are a number of major
currencies, and that the consumer can convert each of them into a minor currency with
probability q, and one major currency into another with probability r ∈ [q,1).W es h a l l
see later that, if a regulator “harmonizes” these major currencies into a single one (as
in the original star graph), equilibrium payoﬀss u r p r i s i n g l yrise. Thus, a regulatory in-
tervention that enhances comparability can make the market outcome less competitive,
once the ﬁrms’ equilibrium response to the intervention is taken into account.
1.2 Overview of the Main Results
We begin our analysis of Nash equilibria by providing a simple necessary and suﬃcient
condition for a perfectly competitive market outcome. The rest of our analysis is mostly
devoted to symmetric mixed equilibria for order-independent graphs that violate the
condition for a competitive outcome. We introduce a novel graph-theoretic property,
called “weighted regularity”, which extends the familiar notion of regular graphs, and
turns out to be the appropriate way to generalize the distinction between the mq > 1
6and mq ≤ 1 cases made in the context of star graphs. A graph is weighted-regular if
nodes can be assigned weights such that each node has the same “weighted” number of
links to the other nodes. Under weighted regularity, all formats are equally comparable,
once the weights are interpreted as the frequency with which they are used. Thus,
weighted regularity captures a weak notion of “frame neutrality ”.
Our main result is that, in any symmetric equilibrium, ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀs
if and only if the graph that represents the comparability structure satisﬁes weighted
regularity. The signiﬁcance of this result is that it establishes a tight link between the
ability of market forces to push ﬁrms to a “constrained competitive” outcome and the
potential neutrality of framing. Furthermore, when the graph is weighted-regular, the
equilibrium marginal format strategy veriﬁes weighted regularity. In addition, weighted
regularity is suﬃcient and necessary for the property that the equilibrium comparison
probability is independent of the ﬁrms’ price realizations. In particular, when the
graph is not weighted-regular, the ﬁrms’ equilibrium price and format decisions are
necessarily correlated.
We apply the main result to two special classes of comparability structures. First,
we provide a complete characterization for deterministic graphs that represent an equiv-
alence relation. Second, we examine a class of order-independent graphs, referred to as
“bi-symmetric”, which generalize star graphs. In bi-symmetric graphs, the set of for-
mats is partitioned into two categories such that the probability of a link between two
formats depends only on the categories to which they belong. We obtain a closed-form
characterization of the (unique) symmetric Nash equilibrium for bi-symmetric graphs.
We use this characterization to convey the lesson that regulatory interventions that
enhance comparability may have subtle anti-competitive eﬀects. We also show that
there is a non-trivial connection between comparability and the extent of consumer
switching that occurs in equilibrium.
In later sections, we relax the order-independence assumption and consider an asym-
metric variant on our model. The concluding section is devoted to a discussion of the
relation between our model and the more conventional view of product diﬀerentiation
based on preference heterogeneity. Some of the proofs are relegated to an appendix.
1.3 Related Literature
Our paper joins recent attempts to formalize in broad terms the various ways in which
choice behavior is sensitive to the “framing” of alternatives. Rubinstein and Salant
(2008) study choice behavior, where the notion of a choice problem is extended to
7include both the choice set and a frame, interpreted as observable information which
should not aﬀect the rational assessment of alternatives but nonetheless aﬀects choice.
A choice function assigns an element in the choice set to every “frame-augmented”
choice problem. Rubinstein and Salant conduct a choice-theoretic analysis of such ex-
tended choice functions, and identify conditions under which extended choice functions
are consistent with utility maximization. Bernheim and Rangel (2007) use a similar
framework to extend standard welfare analysis to situations in which choices are sen-
sitive to frames. Our notion of “frame dependence” is somewhat diﬀerent. First, we
associate frames (i.e., formats) with individual alternatives, rather than entire choice
sets. Second, in our model framing creates preference incompleteness but never leads
to preference reversal. And of course, our focus is on market implications of frame
dependence rather than on choice-theoretic analysis.
This paper is closely related to Eliaz and Spiegler (2010), which ﬁrst formalized
the idea that framing aﬀects preference incompleteness by inﬂuencing the set of al-
ternatives that consumers subject to their preference ranking. There are two major
diﬀerences. First, Eliaz and Spiegler (2010) mostly interpret a frame as advertising
content, and assume that the consumer’s propensity to consider a new market alterna-
tive is a function of its frame and the default’s payoﬀ-relevant details. Second, in the
market applications analyzed in Eliaz and Spiegler (2010), framing decisions are costly
and price setting is assumed away. The resulting market model is substantially diﬀer-
ent from ours, emphasizing the ﬁrms’ trade-oﬀ between increasing their market share
and lowering their advertising costs. Chioveanu and Zhou (2009) analyze a many-ﬁrms
variant on our model in which the comparability structure is a reduced form of the star
graph and consumers lack default options. They show that the market equilibrium
need not converge to the competitive outcome as the number of ﬁrms tends to inﬁnity.
More generally, our paper contributes to a growing theoretical literature on the
market interaction between proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms and boundedly rational consumers.
See Spiegler (2010) for a general treatment of this literature. Within this literature,
Spiegler (2006) and Gabaix and Laibson (2006) share the present paper’s preoccupa-
tion with ﬁrms’ strategic use of “confusing” pricing schemes to increase consumers’
decision errors. In Spiegler (2006), obfuscation is modeled as the introduction of noise,
whereas in Gabaix and Laibson (2006) it is modeled as the shrouding of product at-
tributes. Other papers (Ellison and Wolitzky (2008), Carlin (2009) and Wilson (2010))
stay closer to the rational-consumer paradigm, and model obfuscation as a deliberate
attempt to increase consumers’ search costs.
Finally, our paper can be viewed as an extension of a well-known model due to Var-
8ian (1980), in which consumers are divided into two groups: those who make perfect
price comparisons, and those who are “loyal” to the ﬁrm they are initially assigned to
and thus make no comparison with other market alternatives. In equilibrium, ﬁrms
play a mixed pricing strategy. In Varian’s model, the fraction of “loyal” consumers is
exogenous, whereas in our model it is a function of the formats that ﬁrms adopt for
their products. A central feature of our analysis is the characterization of compara-
bility structures (captured by weighted-regular graphs) which give rise to a constant
equilibrium comparison probability and yield equilibrium pricing strategies identical
to Varian’s.
2T h e M o d e l
A graph is a pair (X,π),w h e r eX is a ﬁnite set of n nodes and π : X ×X → [0,1] is a
function that determines the probability π(x,y) with which a directed edge links node
x to node y. Nodes will be referred to as formats, as they represents various ways in
which ﬁrms can frame the pricing of an intrinsically homogeneous product. A graph
π is deterministic if for every distinct x,y ∈ X, π(x,y) ∈ {0,1}.A g r a p h π is order
independent if π(x,y)=π(y,x) for all x,y ∈ X. Assume that π(x,x)=1for every
x ∈ X - that is, every format is linked to itself.4
We consider a market consisting of two identical, expected-proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms
and one consumer. The ﬁrms produce a homogenous product at zero cost. The con-
sumer is interested in buying one unit of the product. His willingness to pay for
t h ep r o d u c ti s1,i n d e p e n d e n t l yo ft h eﬁrms’ format decisions. The ﬁrms play a
simultaneous-move game with complete information. A pure strategy for ﬁrm i is
ap a i r(pi,x i),w h e r epi ∈ [0,1] is a price and xi ∈ X is a format. Given a realiza-
tion (pi,x i)i=1,2 of the ﬁrms’ strategies, the consumer chooses a ﬁr ma c c o r d i n gt ot h e
following rule. He is randomly assigned to a ﬁrm - with probability 1
2 for each ﬁrm.
Suppose that he is assigned to ﬁrm i. If there is a direct link from xi to xj -a ne v e n t
that occurs with probability π(xi,x j) - the consumer makes a price comparison and
chooses ﬁrm j if pj <p i. In all other cases, the consumer chooses the initially assigned




[1 + π(xj,x i) · 1(pi <p j) − π(xi,x j) · 1(pi >p j)]
4This assumption is made for expositional simplicity. All our results continue to hold (subject to
minor adjustments in the case of Section 5.2) if we assume instead that π(x,x) > 0 for all x ∈ X.
9where 1 is the indicator function.
To illustrate the ﬁrms’ payoﬀ function, consider the graph given by Figure 2, where
X = {x,y}, π(x,y)=q and π(y,x)=0 .S u p p o s e t h a t ﬁrm 1 adopts the format x
while ﬁrm 2 adopts the format y.I fp1 <p 2, ﬁrm 1 earns a payoﬀ of 1
2p1 while ﬁrm 2
earns 1
2p2.I fp1 >p 2, ﬁrm 1 earns p1 · (1
2 − 1






A mixed strategy is a probability measure over [0,1]×X. We will typically represent




,w h e r eλ ∈ ∆(X) is referred to as the
(marginal) format strategy, while Fx is the pricing cdf conditional on the format x.
We will also make use of the following pieces of notation. For every interval I ⊂
Supp(F),l e tλ
I denote the format strategy conditional on the event that the price
realization lies in an interval I.W h e n I includes only one price p, the conditional
format strategy is denoted by λ
p.G i v e nacdf F on [0,1],l e tF− denote its left limit.
For any subset non-empty Z ⊆ X, U(Z) denotes the uniform distribution over Z.
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2.1 Hide and Seek
Our analysis will make use of an auxiliary two-player, zero-sum game, which is a
generalization of familiar games such as Matching Pennies. The players (not to be
identiﬁed with the ﬁrms), named hider and seeker and denoted by h and s,s h a r et h e
same action space X. Given the action proﬁle (xh,x s), the hider’s payoﬀ is −π(xh,x s)
and the seeker’s payoﬀ is π(xh,x s). This game will be referred to as the hide-and-seek
game associated with (X,π). Given a mixed-strategy proﬁle (λh,λ s) in this game, the







To see the relevance of this auxiliary game to our model, suppose that ﬁrm 1’s
marginal format and pricing strategies are λ and F, respectively, where the latter is
continuous with support [pl,p u].W h e nﬁrm 2 considers charging the price pu,i ts h o u l d
select a format that minimizes the probability of a price comparison. Hence, it behaves
as a hider in the hide-and-seek game, facing a seeker who plays λ. Similarly, when ﬁrm 2
considers charging the price pl, it should select a format that maximizes the probability
of a price comparison. Hence, it behaves as a seeker in the hide-and-seek game, facing
ah i d e rw h op l a y sλ.W h e naﬁrm considers charging an intermediate price, it reasons
partly as a hider and partly as a seeker.
The value of the hide-and-seek game is
v





The max-min payoﬀ of a ﬁrm in our model is thus 1
2(1 − v∗). The reason is that the
worst-case scenario for a ﬁrm is that its opponent plays p =0and adopts the seeker’s
max-min format strategy, to which a best-reply is to play p =1and a format strategy
that minimizes the probability of a price comparison.
A ﬁrm charging a price that is lower than the opponent’s price can enforce a com-
parison probability of at least v∗, and therefore get a market share of at least 1
2(1+v∗).
This is a lower bound on the market share that a ﬁrm obtains in any Nash equilibrium
when it charges the lowest price in the equilibrium distribution.
2.2 Preliminary Analysis of Nash Equilibria
We will conduct a detailed analysis of Nash equilibria in the sequel. In this sub-section,
we present two preliminary ﬁndings.
Proposition 1 The game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The proof is an application of Corollary 5.3 in Reny (1999), and is omitted. The
following proposition gives necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a competitive equi-
librium outcome.
11Proposition 2 In any Nash equilibrium, both ﬁrms play p =0with probability one if
and only if there exists a format x∗ ∈ X such that π(y,x∗)=1for every y ∈ X.
For the rest of the paper, we assume that the following condition holds:
(*) For every x ∈ X there exists y 6= x such that π(y,x) < 1.
This ensures that the ﬁrms’ max-min payoﬀ is strictly positive - or, equivalently,
that the value of the associated hide-and-seek game is strictly below one. The proof
of Proposition 2 relies on price undercutting arguments that are somewhat subtle. For
instance, suppose that ﬁrm 1’s marginal pricing strategy has a mass point at some price
p∗ which belongs to the support of ﬁrm 2’s marginal pricing strategy. In conventional
models of price competition, there is a clear incentive for ﬁrm 2 to undercut its price
slightly below p∗. In our model, however, when the original strategy proﬁle is asymmet-
ric, price undercutting may have to be accompanied by a change in the format strategy
in order to be eﬀective. Adopting a new format strategy may be undesirable for ﬁrm
2 because it could raise the probability of a price comparison when the realization of
ﬁrm 1’s pricing strategy is even lower.
Once a competitive equilibrium outcome has been ruled out, any Nash equilibrium
must be mixed. To see why, assume that each ﬁrm i plays a pure strategy (pi,x i).I f
0 <p i ≤ pj,t h e nﬁrm j can proﬁtably deviate to the strategy (pi −ε,xi),w h e r eε>0
is arbitrarily small. If pi =0 , ﬁrm i earns zero proﬁts, contradicting the observation
that the ﬁrms’ max-min payoﬀs are strictly positive.
2.3 Discussion
We devote this sub-section to a discussion of several features of our model.
Is consumer choice rational?
Fully rational consumers with perfect ability to make comparisons are represented by
a complete graph - i.e. π(x,y)=1for all x,y ∈ X. For a typically incomplete graph,
the consumer’s choice behavior is inconsistent with maximizing a random utility func-
tion over price-format pairs. To see why, consider the following deterministic, order-
independent graph: X = {a,b,c}, π(x,y)=1for all x,y ∈ X except for π(a,c)=0 .
Suppose that p<p 0 <p 00. When faced with the strategy proﬁle ((p,a),(p0,b)),t h e
consumer chooses (p,a) with probability one. Similarly, when faced with the strat-
egy proﬁle ((p0,b),(p00,c)), the consumer chooses (p0,b) with probability one. However,
12when faced with the strategy proﬁle ((p,a),(p00,c)), the consumer chooses each alterna-
tive with probability 1
2. No random utility function over [0,1]×X can rationalize such
behavior. The reason is that the graph represents an intransitive binary relation which
induces intransitivity in the implied revealed preference relation over price-format pairs.
In general, our model of consumer choice with deterministic graphs is a special case
of incomplete preferences over [0,1] × X. Both strict and weak preference relations
may be intransitive, yet a strict preference relation is acyclic. A probabilistic graph
represents a distribution over such incomplete preferences.
Irrelevance of prices for comparability
Although our framework is quite general, it does rely on a strong, admittedly prob-
lematic assumption: the comparability of market alternatives depends only on their
formats, and not on the actual prices. Since the modeler could always incorporate
prices into the deﬁnition of formats, the real assumption made here is that a ﬁrm’s
choice of format does not restrict the set of prices it can charge.
This assumption clearly entails a loss of generality. Suppose, for example, that
ﬁrms sell a product with attributes A and B; a format is a price pair (pA,p B),a n d
the price paid by the consumer is pA + pB. Then, a ﬁrm’s choice of format uniquely
determines its price, contrary to our assumption. An interesting generalization would
assume that every format x ∈ X is associated with a set of feasible prices P(x).
Default bias
Although the default bias inherent in the consumer’s choice procedure is backed by
experimental evidence and everyday intuition, one could contemplate alternative as-
sumptions as to how consumers choose when confronting formats that are hard to
compare . For example, they could randomize between ﬁrms, or switch away from
the default with probability one. It should be emphasized that in the case of order-
independent graphs, these alternative assumptions (as well as any rule that does not
discriminate between ﬁrms 1 and 2)a r eequivalent for equilibrium analysis, since they
induce the same payoﬀ function for the ﬁrms; they are relevant only for the analysis of
switching rates. Only when order independence is relaxed do these assumptions matter
for ﬁrms’ equilibrium behavior.
Reservation values
In our model ﬁrms cannot use their format decisions to fool consumers into paying
a price above the reservation value, even when they are unable to compare formats.
One could argue that if consumers have limited ability to understand the price they
13are facing, ﬁrms should be able to charge prices above their willingness to pay. This
diﬃculty with the interpretation of the reservation value is shared by many market
models with boundedly rational consumers. One justiﬁcation is that there is an implicit
ex-post participation constraint, which prevents ﬁrms from charging prices above the
reservation value. This justiﬁcation makes a great deal of sense, given the assumption
on default choice in our model. Even if a consumer does not understand the price
structure of the default option, he can appreciate whether he actually pays more than
his reservation value and quit buying from that ﬁrm.
Exogeneity of the comparability structure
Our model takes the comparability structure as given: the function π represents an
exogenous distribution over an unobservable characteristic of consumers, namely their
ability to compare formats. We view this as a primitive of the consumers’ choice pro-
cedure, analogous to their preferences. The comparability structure could be derived
from a larger decision problem, in which the consumer (optimally) chooses in a prior
stage whether to acquire this ability by incurring “thinking costs”. For example, in the
“star graph” example of Section 1.1, the consumer’s inability to convert one currency
into another could be derived from an earlier decision not to memorize the exchange
rate. However, for many purposes, it makes sense to regard π as exogenous. Even if
the consumer’s mastery of exchange rates is a consequence of prior optimization, it is
probably obtained taking into account a multitude of market situations, in addition to
the one in question. In other words, it is optimization in a “general equilibrium” sense,
whereas we focus on a “partial equilibrium” analysis.
As we shall see below, a property of random graphs called “weighted regularity”
turns out to be of crucial importance for equilibrium analysis in our model. Therefore,
it would be very interesting whether this property is selected or ruled out by a larger
model that endogenizes the comparability structure. We leave this question for future
work.
Simultaneity of price and format decisions
Our model assumes a ﬁrm simultaneously chooses a price and a format. An alternative
modeling strategy would be to assume that ﬁrms compete in prices only after commit-
ting to the format. We opt for the former because we believe that in most situations of
interest - particularly in modern online environments - determining a product’s price
and how to present it are naturally joint decisions; it would be implausible to allow
commitment in formats but not in prices.
At any rate, analyzing the alternative, two-stage model is straightforward. For
14simplicity, consider the case of order-independent graphs. For a given proﬁle (x1,x 2)
of the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst-stage format decisions, the price competition second-stage subgame
proceeds exactly as in Varian (1980), where the probability that the consumer makes
ac o m p a r i s o ni sﬁxed at π(x1,x 2).I nt h eﬁrst stage, ﬁrms make their format decisions
as if they play a common-interest game: they share the payoﬀ function −π,a n d ,i n
equilibrium, each ﬁrm i chooses a format strategy λi that minimizes v(·,λ j).F o r
example, whenever the graph has two formats x and y such that π(x,y)=0 ,i ti sa n
equilibrium for one ﬁrm to choose x and the other to choose y in the ﬁrst stage, with
both ﬁrms playing p =1in the second stage.
3W e i g h t e d R e g u l a r i t y
In the next sections, we will focus on the case of order-independent graphs. In this
section we introduce a notion of “uniform comparability” across formats, which turns
out to be crucial for analysis of Nash equilibria. The degree of comparability of diﬀerent
formats depends on the frequency with which they are adopted, except for the case in
which they are all linked with probability equal to one. Whether uniform comparability
is potentially obtainable depends on the structure of a graph. Consider, for example,
the standard notion of regularity: an order-independent graph is regular if there exists
an u m b e r¯ v>0 such that
P
y∈X π(x,y)=¯ v for all x ∈ X. In a regular graph,
the uniform distribution over X induces a uniform comparison probability across all
formats. A natural generalization of this notion of potential uniform comparability is
obtained by allowing nodes to be chosen with arbitrary probabilities.
Deﬁnition 1 An order-independent graph (X,π) is weighted-regular if there exist β ∈
∆(X) and ¯ v ∈ [0,1] such that
P
y∈X β (y)π(x,y)=¯ v for any x ∈ X. We say that β
veriﬁes weighted regularity.
The economic interpretation of weighted regularity is that it is possible for one ﬁrm
to make its opponent indiﬀerent among all frames - in other words, to “neutralize”
the relevance of framing for the rival ﬁrm’s competitive strategy. The following are
examples of weighted-regular, order-independent graphs.
Example 3.1: Equivalence relations. Consider a deterministic graph in which π(x,y)=
1 if and only if x ∼ y,w h e r e∼ is an equivalence relation. Any distribution that assigns
equal probability to each equivalence class veriﬁes weighted regularity.
15Example 3.2: A cycle with random links.L e tX = {1,2,...,n},w h e r en is even. Assume
that for every distinct x,y ∈ X, π(x,y)=1
2 if |y − x| ∈ {1,n− 1},a n dπ(x,y)=0
otherwise. A uniform distribution over all odd-numbered nodes (or all even-numbered
nodes) veriﬁes weighted regularity, with ¯ v = 2
n.5
Example 3.3: Linear similarity. Consider the following deterministic graph. Let X =
{1,2,...,3L},w h e r eL ≥ 2 is an integer. For every distinct x,y ∈ X, π(x,y)=1if
and only if |x − y| =1 . A uniform distribution over the subset {3k −1}k=1,...,L veriﬁes
weighted regularity.
Example 3.4: Star graphs. The star graph of Section 1.1 is weighted-regular whenever
mq ≤ 1.L e t xc denote the core node. The format strategy that veriﬁes weighted
regularity in this case is λ
∗,d e ﬁned by the following equation, which holds for every
peripheral format x 6= xc:
λ
∗(xc) · 1+( 1− λ
∗(xc)) · q = λ
∗(xc) · q + λ
∗(x) · 1
The L.H.S. is the probability of a price comparison of the format xc, while the R.H.S.
is the probability of a price comparison of any peripheral format x 6= xc.
The following lemma establishes an equivalent deﬁnition of weighted regularity,
which makes use of the auxiliary hide-and-seek game. An order-independent graph
is weighted-regular if and only if the associated hide-and-seek game has a symmetric
Nash equilibrium. To put it somewhat crudely, weighted regularity means that the
actions of a ﬁrm that maximizes comparability need not be distinct from the actions
of a ﬁrm that minimizes it.
Lemma 1 In an order-independent graph (X,π), the distribution λ ∈ ∆(X) veriﬁes
weighted regularity if and only if (λ,λ) is a Nash equilibrium in the associated hide-
and-seek game.
Proof. (i) Suppose that λ veriﬁes weighted regularity. If one of the players in the
associated hide-and-seek game plays λ, every strategy for the opponent - including λ
itself - is a best-reply. Therefore, λ is a symmetric equilibrium strategy.
(ii) Suppose that (λ,λ) is a Nash equilibrium in the associated hide-and-seek game.
5Note that any convex combination of these two format strategies also veriﬁes weighted regularity.
This is a general property: the set of format strategies that verify weighted regularity for a given
graph is convex.
16Denote v(λ,λ)=¯ v. If some format attains a higher (lower) probability of a price
comparison than ¯ v,t h e nλ cannot be a best-reply for the seeker (hider). Therefore,
every format generates the same probability of a price comparison - namely ¯ v -a g a i n s t
λ.
Providing a general characterization of the set of weighted-regular graphs is a diﬃ-
cult problem, which we leave for future work. The following result provides a suﬃcient
condition for weighted regularity.
Proposition 3 Suppose that for some graph (X,π), there exists a format strategy
λ ∈ argmaxminv such that λ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X.T h e n ,(X,π) is weighted-regular.
The proof of this result relies entirely on the associated hide-and-seek game. It
shows that if the seeker in the hide-and-seek game has a max-min strategy with full
support, there must exist a symmetric Nash equilibrium in this game.
4 Nash Equilibrium under Order Independence
In this section, we analyze Nash equilibria for order-independent graphs. We restrict




be a symmetric Nash
equilibrium strategy. Note that the assumption that π(x,x)=1for all x ∈ X ensures
that, by standard arguments, Fx is continuous for any x ∈ Supp(λ). Therefore, the
marginal pricing strategy F is also continuous. In addition, there exists pl ∈ (0,1) such
that Supp(F)=[ pl,1]. This property is entirely conventional in models of imperfect
price competition (including Varian (1980)), and the proof is therefore omitted.
We are now ready for the two main results of the paper. First, we establish equiv-
alence between weighted regularity and the property that ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀs
in symmetric equilibrium.
Theorem 1 In any symmetric equilibrium, ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀsi fa n do n l yi f
(X,π) is weighted-regular. Furthermore, if (X,π) is weighted-regular, then in symmet-
ric equilibrium, each ﬁrm’s marginal format strategy veriﬁes weighted regularity.
Proof. (i) Weighted regularity =⇒ max-min payoﬀs. In fact, we will prove a stronger
result. Fix a symmetric Nash equilibrium. For every p ∈ [0,1],d e ﬁne s(p) as a ﬁrm’s




[1 + (1 − F(p))v
∗ − F(p)v
∗] (1)
for every p ∈ [pl,1].
First notice that, since F(p) is continuous, s(p) is also continuous. By weighted
regularity, each ﬁrm can enforce a constant comparison probability v∗, independently
of the opponent’s action, and thus obtain a market share
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By the equilibrium symmetry, each ﬁr m ’ se x - a n t em a r k e ts h a r ei se q u a lt o1
2,a n d
thus (1) follows. Since s(1) = 1
2(1 − v∗), ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀs. Also, s(pl)=
1
2(1 + v∗).S i n c es(pl)=1
2[1 + maxv(·,λ)] and s(1) = 1
2[1 − minv(·,λ)], it follows that
maxv(·,λ)=m i nv(·,λ)=v∗, and hence λ veriﬁes weighted regularity.
(ii) Max-min payoﬀs =⇒ Weighted regularity. Assume that ﬁrms earn max-min
payoﬀs in some symmetric equilibrium. Then, s(1) = 1
2(1 − v∗). Recall that s(pl) ≥
1
2(1 + v∗). If this holds with equality, then minv(·,λ)=m a x v(·,λ)=v∗, hence
weighted regularity holds. Thus, suppose that si(pl) > 1
2(1 + v∗). Since each ﬁrm’s
e x - a n t em a r k e ts h a r ei s1
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θ(x)λ(y) · [(1 − 2F
y(p)) · π(x,y)] < (1 − F(p))v
∗ − F(p)v
∗ (3)







y(p) · π(x,y) <v
∗(1 − 2F(p))
Because ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀs by hypothesis, λ max-minimizes v, and hence









for every θ, contradicting the fact that v∗ =m i nm a x ( v). Therefore, (X,π) is weighted-
regular.
T h ee c o n o m i cs i g n i ﬁc a n c eo ft h i sr e s u l ti st h a ti te s t a b l i s h e sat i g h tl i n kb e t w e e n
two aspects of market interaction. On one hand, when ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀsi n
equilibrium, market forces have driven industry proﬁts to the “constrained competitive”
level - i.e., the lowest proﬁt compatible with consumers’ bounded rationality and ﬁrms’
individual rationality. On the other hand, weighted regularity implies that the eﬀect
of framing on price comparison can potentially be neutralized. The theorem states
that the two properties are equivalent: a constrained competitive equilibrium market
outcome goes hand in hand with the notion of potential frame neutrality captured by
weighted regularity.
F o rar o u g hi n t u i t i o nf o rT h e o r e m1 ,r e c a l lt h a tw h e nﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀsi n
a symmetric equilibrium, their marginal format strategy max-minimizes the probability
of a price comparison - that is, it is a max-min strategy for the seeker in the associated
hide-and-seek game. Also recall that when a ﬁrm charges a price toward the high (low)
end of the price distribution, it has an incentive to select a format as if it were the hider
(seeker) in the hide-and-seek game. When a graph is not weighted-regular, “acting
like a hider” is necessarily distinct from “acting like a seeker”. Therefore, since the
marginal format strategy integrates over the ﬁrms’ choices of formats across all prices,
it is impossible for the marginal format strategy to coincide with a seeker’s max-min
strategy in the hide-and-seek game. As a result, the ﬁrms’ equilibrium payoﬀ exceeds
the max-min level. In contrast, when the graph is weighted-regular, a ﬁrm can choose
to play a format strategy that acts “like a hider” and “like a seeker” at the same time.
If a ﬁrm did not know its relative position in the price distribution, it could secure a
comparison probability of exactly v∗. Thus, the expression 1
2[1+(1−F(p))v∗−F(p)v∗]
eﬀectively serves as a lower bound on the ﬁrm’s market share, for any price it considers
19charging. Since each ﬁrm gets a market share of 50% ex ante, this bound is binding
in equilibrium, which implies that, when a ﬁrm charges p =1 , it earns the max-min
payoﬀ 1
2(1 − v∗).
Theorem 1 has an immediate implication for the structure of the ﬁrms’ pricing
strategy under weighted regularity.
Corollary 1 Suppose that (X,π) is weighted-regular. Then, in any symmetric equi-








deﬁned over the support [
1 − v∗
1+v∗,1].
Proof. By Theorem 1, the ﬁrms’ symmetric equilibrium market share as a function
of the price they charge is given by (1). We have established that each ﬁrm earns
the max-min payoﬀ 1
2(1 − v∗) in equilibrium. Therefore, each ﬁrm’s payoﬀ from any











T h eu n i q u es o l u t i o nt ot h i sf u n c t i o n a le q u a t i o ni sF∗.
Equation (4) deﬁnes the equilibrium strategy in the two-ﬁrm case of Varian’s model
described in Section 1.3 (Varian (1980)). The intuition for this result is simple. Under
weighted regularity the ﬁrms’ equilibrium market share is determined as a function
of the prices they charge, as if the comparison probability was exogenously set at v∗,
which is precisely what Varian’s model assumes a priori.
Our second main result concerns the equilibrium relation between the probability
that consumers make a price comparison and the realizations of the ﬁrms’ pricing
strategies. We will say that a symmetric equilibrium exhibits a constant comparison
probability if v(λ
I,λ
J) is the same for every pair of closed intervals I,J ⊆ [pl,1].
Theorem 2 A symmetric equilibrium exhibits a constant comparison probability if and
only if (X,π) is weighted-regular. Furthermore, if (X,π) is weighted-regular, the con-
stant equilibrium comparison probability is v∗.
Proof. (i) Constant comparison probability =⇒ Weighted regularity. Assume a con-
stant comparison probability. Then, in particular, v(λ
1,λ)=v(λ
pl
,λ).B u t s i n c e
20λ
1 ∈ argminv(·,λ) and λ
pl
∈ argmaxv(·,λ), it follows that λ veriﬁes weighted regu-
larity, such that v(x,λ)=v∗ for every x ∈ X.
(ii) Weighted regularity =⇒ Constant comparison probability. Recall that in the
p r o o fo fT h e o r e m1(i) w ed e r i v e de q u a t i o n( 1 )f o re v e r yp ∈ [pl,1]. This equation can


















Hence, for every p ∈ [pl,1], λ
[pl,p] ∈ argmaxminv and λ
[p,1] ∈ argminmaxv.T h u s ,f o r
every p,q ∈ [pl,1], (λ
[q,1],λ
[pl,p]) is a Nash equilibrium in the hide-and-seek game, and
therefore v(λ
[q,1],λ
[pl,p])=v∗. Now consider two arbitrary price intervals [a,b],[c,d] ⊆
[pl,1]. We established that v(λ
I,λ
J)=v∗ for every I ∈ {[pl,a],[pl,b]} and every
J ∈ {[c,1],[d,1]}. It follows that v(λ
[a,b],λ
[c,d])=v∗.
The proof of Theorem 1 establishes that under weighted regularity, a ﬁrm’s market
share when it charges a price p is 1
2[1+(1 −F(p))v∗ −F(p)v∗] - that is, it is the same
as if it faces a constant comparison probability of v∗. Theorem 2 shows that this is
not merely an “as if” property; it does hold in a symmetric equilibrium if and only if
the graph is weighted-regular.
T h ep r e v i o u sr e s u l t ss h e ds o m el i g h to nw h e t h e raﬁrm’s pricing and format deci-
sions exhibit correlation. An immediate corollary of Theorem 2 is that, when weighted
regularity is violated, price and format decisions must be correlated. The reason is
simple: if these decisions are statistically independent, it follows that each ﬁrm adopts
the same format strategy when it charges a high or a low price - i.e., λ
pl
= λ




1 maximize and minimize v(·,λ),r e s p e c t i v e l y ,t h e nλ veriﬁes weighted
regularity, a contradiction.
However, the converse is not true: weighted regularity does not rule out correlation
between ﬁrms’ equilibrium price and format decisions. A trivial example is obtained
taking a weighted-regular graph and replicating one of its nodes, so that the new graph
contains two distinct formats x,x0 with π(x,y)=π(x0,y) for every y ∈ X. In this case,
we can construct an equilibrium in which the format x is associated with low prices
while the format x0 is associated with high prices. For a non-trivial example, consider
the deterministic, nine-node graph given by Figure 3. A uniform distribution over
21the six bold-face nodes veriﬁes weighted regularity (¯ v = 1
3). By Theorem 1, this is the
marginal format strategy in any symmetric equilibrium. However, one can construct an
equilibrium in which price and format decisions are correlated. Speciﬁcally, the three
peripheral nodes are played with probability 1
3 each conditional on p ∈ [2
3,1], while
their internal neighbors are played with probability 1





It should be noted that when a graph is weighted-regular and the hide-and-seek
game has a unique equilibrium (which is therefore symmetric), there is a unique sym-
metric equilibrium in our model, and in this equilibrium the ﬁrms’ price and format
decisions must be independent. This result follows immediately from the proof of The-
orem 2. Under weighted regularity, for every ﬁrm i and every price p in the support of
the equilibrium strategy, λ
[pl,p] max-minimizes v and λ
[p,1] min-maximizes v. Thus, by
hypothesis, λ
[pl,p] = λ
[p,1] = λ,a n de a c hﬁrm plays the format strategy λ independently
of the price it charges.
5 Two Special Cases
In this section we provide a complete analysis of symmetric equilibria for two speciﬁc
classes of graphs.
6This example also illustrates that weighted regularity does not imply that in equilibrium, ﬁrms
are indiﬀerent among all formats at all prices. For example, when a ﬁrm charges the cutoﬀ price
p = 2
3, it strictly prefers the bold-face nodes to any of the three other nodes. The indiﬀerence among
all formats holds at the extreme prices p = 1
2 and p =1 .
225.1 Equivalence Comparability Relations
Example 3.1 presented a class of deterministic graphs that represent an equivalence
relation (i.e., a symmetric and transitive binary relation). Such graphs have a special
status from a decision-theoretic perspective. Recall that the choice behavior induced
by our model is typically inconsistent with utility maximization. Furthermore, the
revealed strict preference relation is typically intransitive. Among all deterministic
graphs, assuming that the graph represents an equivalence relation is equivalent to
assuming that the revealed strict preference relation induced by the model of consumer
choice is transitive.
As already noted, graphs that represent equivalence relations are weighted-regular.
For such graphs, a format strategy veriﬁes weighted regularity if and only if it assigns
equal weight to each equivalence class. Let m denote the number of equivalence classes.
Then, v∗ = 1
m. By Theorem 2, every symmetric Nash equilibrium exhibits a constant
comparison probability of 1
m. Therefore, it must be the case that in equilibrium, the
ﬁrms’ format strategy assigns probability 1
m to each equivalence class conditional on
any price in the support.7 Thus, we can restate the result as follows. If the revealed
strict preference relation induced by the consumer’s choice model is transitive, then in
Nash equilibrium, ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀs; furthermore, we can partition the set
of formats such that ﬁrms mix uniformly over all partition cells independently of the
price they charge. This partition can be elicited from individual consumer behavior:
x and y belong to the same cell if and only if the consumer displays a strict revealed
preference for all pairs (p,x) and (p0,y) whenever p 6= p0.
5.2 Bi-Symmetric Graphs
In this sub-section, we focus on another special class of graphs, which extends the star
graph example of Section 1.1. An order-independent graph (X,π) is bi-symmetric if





qY if x,y ∈ Y
qZ if x,y ∈ Z
qi f x ∈ Y , y ∈ Z
where max{qY,q Z,q} < 1.L e tnI denote the number of formats in category I ∈ {Y,Z}.
In the star graph, nZ =1 , nY = m,a n dqY =0 .
7When all equivalence classes are singletons, the symmetric equilibrium is then unique. Piccione
and Spiegler (2009) prove that there exist no asymmetric equilibria in this case.
23Bi-symmetric graphs are attractive because they enable us to capture various “sto-
ries” behind limited comparability with simple restrictions on parameter values. When
q<min{qY,q Z}, we may interpret formats within each of the two categories Y and
Z as relatively similar and therefore relatively easy to compare, whereas formats from
diﬀerent categories are more diﬃcult to compare. In contrast, when qY <q<q Z,w e
may interpret the formats in category Z as inherently simpler than those in Y (pos-
sibly because they contain translations or conversion guides that are absent from the
formats in Y ).




1+qI · (nI − 1)
nI
Without loss of generality, assume q∗
Z ≥ q∗
Y.





Z − q) ≥ 0
The star graph satisﬁes q∗
Z =1and q∗
Y = 1
m, and hence this inequality holds if and
only if mq ≤ 1.W h e n q∗
Y = q∗
Z = q, there is a continuum of format strategies that
verify weighted regularity. When (q∗
Y −q)(q∗
Z −q) > 0, the unique format strategy that




Y − q)+( q∗
Z − q)
to the set Z, and mixes uniformly within each of the sets Y and Z. W ed e n o t et h i s
format strategy by λ
∗. In this case, the hide-and-seek game has (λ
∗,λ
∗) as the unique
Nash equilibrium.












Z − q) > 0,a n dv∗ = q when (q∗
Y − q)(q∗
Z − q)=0 .
The following equilibrium characterization follows directly from our results in the
previous section.
Proposition 4 Let (X,π) be a bi-symmetric graph. If (q∗
Y −q)(q∗
Z −q) > 0,t h e r ei sa
unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, in which ﬁrms play the format strategy λ
∗,a n dt h e
24pricing strategy (4) at every node, where v∗ is given by (5). Firms earn the max-min
payoﬀ 1
2(1 − v∗).8
When the condition for weighted regularity is not satisﬁed - i.e., when q is strictly
between q∗
Y and q∗
Z - the value of the hide-and-seek game is v∗ = q, since there is a
Nash equilibrium in this game in which the seeker (hider) plays U(Z) (U(Y )). We use
this observation to construct a symmetric equilibrium strategy which has the following
“cutoﬀ” structure. There exists a price pm ∈ (pl,1), such that the format strategy
conditional on any price p ∈ [pl,p m) is U(Z), and the format strategy conditional on









Note that the total probability that the marginal format strategy assigns to the set Z
(Y )i sF(pm) (1−F(pm)). The conditional pricing strategies are given by the following
pair of functional equations which constitute the indiﬀerence conditions that charac-
terize the mixed-strategy equilibrium. Let FZ (FY) denote the pricing cdf conditional
















Similarly, for every p ∈ [pm,1]:
p
2













The R.H.S on each of these two equations represents the ﬁrms’ equilibrium payoﬀ.


















Observe that this expression for the ﬁrms’ equilibrium payoﬀ exceeds the max-min
level 1
2(1 − q), in accordance with Theorem 1. The following proposition establishes
that there are no other symmetric equilibria.9
8When q∗
Y = q∗
Z = q, the result is slightly weaker. In symmetric equilibrium, the marginal framing
strategy veriﬁes weighted regularity, and the pricing strategy is (4), where v∗ = q.H o w e v e r , t h e
inﬁnite number of framing strategies that verify weighted regularity can give rise to payoﬀ-irrelevant
correlation between the ﬁrms’ pricing and framing decisions.
9To check that the strategy given by (6)-(8) is indeed a symmetric equilibrium strategy, all we need
25Proposition 5 Let (X,π) be a bi-symmetric graph. If (q∗
Y − q)(q∗
Z − q) < 0,t h e r ei s
a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, which is the cutoﬀ equilibrium characterized by
(6)-(8). The ﬁrms’ equilibrium payoﬀ is given by (9).
As mentioned before, the classiﬁcation of bi-symmetric graphs into those that satisfy
weighted regularity and those that do not matches two diﬀerent interpretations of the
set of formats Y and Z. The results in this section imply that when parameter values
ﬁt situations in which the categorization of formats captures their relative complexity,
the ﬁrms’ equilibrium strategy displays correlation between price and format decisions,
and ﬁrms earn “collusive” proﬁts. In contrast, when parameter values ﬁts i t u a t i o n si n
which the categorization of formats captures their similarity, the equilibrium strategy
displays price-format independence and ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀs.
6 Does Greater Comparability Lead to a More Com-
petitive Outcome?
A basic intuition that underlies the consumer protection statements quoted in the
Introduction is that greater comparability of price formats makes the market more
competitive and therefore favors consumers. Indeed, if consumers faced a ﬁxed set of
price-format pairs, switching from a comparability structure π to another structure π0
that satisﬁes π0(x,y) ≥ π(x,y) for every x,y ∈ X would make consumers weakly better
oﬀ, because the probability they will choose the cheapest alternative can only go up.
Is the competitive eﬀect of greater comparability robust to equilibrium analysis?
When π0 is weighted-regular, the answer is clearly aﬃrmative. As we saw, under
weighted regularity both ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀs. Clearly, greater comparability
lowers the max-min payoﬀ, because it raises the seeker’s equilibrium payoﬀ in the
hide-and-seek game.
The answer is diﬀerent when π0 is not weighted-regular. Consider the case of bi-
symmetric graphs that violate weighted regularity, where equilibrium payoﬀsa r eg i v e n
by (9). Imagine a regulator who wishes to impose a product description standard that
will enhance comparability. Suppose that q∗
Y <q<q ∗
Z. If the regulator’s intervention
increases the values of q and q∗
Y, the intervention will lower equilibrium proﬁts. If,
h o w e v e r ,t h ei n t e r v e n t i o nc a u s e sa ni n c r e a s ei nt h ev a l u eo fq∗
Z (without changing q
to do is verify that ﬁrms weakly prefer adopting formats in Z (Y ) conditional on charging p ≤ pm
(p ≥ pm). We leave this task to the reader.
26and q∗
Y), the intervention will raise equilibrium proﬁts (without aﬀecting the max-min
payoﬀ).
The intuition is as follows. In the cutoﬀ equilibrium, the probability that a ﬁrm
charging p =1faces a price comparison is a weighted average of q and q∗
Y.T h ep a r a -
meter q∗
Z aﬀects this probability only indirectly, by changing the equilibrium weights.
Speciﬁcally, a higher q∗
Z gives expensive ﬁrms a stronger incentive to adopt the “hid-
ing” formats that constitute Y . As a result, the equilibrium cutoﬀ price pm changes
and ﬁrms are more likely to charge a price above pm and thus adopt the Y formats.
Since the intervention leaves q and q∗
Y unchanged, and since q>q ∗
Y, the overall prob-
ability that an expensive ﬁrm faces a price comparison decreases. Hence, expensive
ﬁrms enjoy greater market power de facto. We can see that “local” improvements in
comparability - such as increasing the transparency of already-simple formats - may
have a detrimental impact on consumer welfare.
7 Consumer Switching
The case of bi-symmetric graphs also enables us to address the issue of consumer
switching, and qualify the message of the consumer protection reports quoted in the
Introduction, namely that greater comparability leads to more frequent switching.
In symmetric equilibrium, the probability with which the consumer switches be-
tween ﬁrms conditional on making a price comparison (a quantity known in the mar-
keting literature as the “conversion rate”) is 1
2. This is an immediate corollary of the
symmetry of π: conditional on making a comparison, the consumer faces a symmetric
posterior probability distribution over price proﬁles (p1,p 2), independently of the iden-
tity of the consumer’s default option. Since the marginal equilibrium pricing strategy
is continuous, the probability that the default is the more expensive option is 1
2.
Since the conversion rate is 1
2, it follows that the switching rate is half the prob-
ability that consumers make a price comparison. Under weighted regularity, we saw
that the comparison probability is v∗, independently of the prices that ﬁrms charge,
and therefore the switching rate is 1
2v∗ in equilibrium. Thus, when we compare two
weighted-regular graphs, any improvement in comparability leads to a higher switching
rate (and, as we saw, lower equilibrium proﬁts). This corroborates the intuition that
more frequent switching is associated with greater competitiveness.
When weighted regularity is violated, the situation is diﬀerent. In the case of












The co-movement of this expression with the competitiveness of the market outcome is
ambiguous because, as we already showed, equilibrium proﬁts in the relevant parameter
range increase with q∗
Y and decrease with q∗
Z. Thus, when the ﬁrms’ equilibrium price
and format decisions are correlated, the positive link between the switching rate and
market competitiveness may break down.
8 Order-Dependent Graphs
In this section we relax order independence and explore the robustness of our main
result to this extension. We begin by extending the notion of weighted regularity.
Deﬁnition 2 Ag r a p h(X,π) is weakly weighted-regular if there exist β ∈ ∆(X) and
¯ v ∈ [0,1] such that
P
y∈X β (y)π(x,y) ≥ ¯ v ≥
P
y∈X β (y)π(y,x) for all x ∈ X.W e
say that β veriﬁes weak weighted regularity.
O b s e r v et h a tt h i sd e ﬁnition is reduced to weighted regularity when the graph is
order-independent. The following example illustrates the diﬀerence between the two
concepts. Let X = {a,b,c}, π(a,b)=π(a,c)=1and π(x,y)=0f o ra l lo t h e rd i s t i n c t
x,y. A format strategy that assigns probability 1
2 to each of the formats b and c veriﬁes
weak weighted regularity. However, the graph is not weighted-regular.
When β veriﬁes weak weighted regularity, the two weak inequalities in Deﬁnition
2 are binding for every x in the support of β. To see why, suppose that the L.H.S
inequality in Deﬁnition 2 is strict for some x ∈ X for which β(x) > 0. Then, summing





β (y)π(x,y)=v(β,β) > ¯ v





β (y)π(y,x)=v(β,β) ≤ ¯ v
a contradiction.
28Building on this observation, it is possible to establish an equivalent deﬁnition of
weak weighted regularity in terms of the associated hide-and-seek game, as in Section
3. This equivalence implies that when β veriﬁes weak weighted regularity, ¯ v is equal
to v∗, the value of the associated hide-and-seek game. The proof is omitted because it
proceeds as the proof of the analogous Lemma 1.
Lemma 2 The distribution λ ∈ ∆(X) veriﬁes weak weighted regularity in a graph
(X,π) if and only if (λ,λ) is a Nash equilibrium in the associated hide-and-seek game.
The link between weighted regularity and max-min equilibrium payoﬀs, established
for order-independent graphs, survives the present extension only in one direction.
Proposition 6 Suppose that (X,π) satisﬁes weak weighted regularity. Then, ﬁrms
earn max-min payoﬀs in any symmetric Nash equilibrium.
The proof follows the same line of reasoning as Theorem 1(i). Fix a symmetric Nash
equilibrium. By weak weighted regularity, there exists a format strategy β ∈ ∆(X)
such that: (i) the probability that a consumer who is initially assigned to the ﬁrm will
make a price comparison is weakly below v∗; the probability that a consumer who is
initially assigned to the opponent will make a price comparison is weakly above v∗.I t
follows that the ﬁrm’s market share is bounded from below by
1
2
[1 + (1 − F(p))v
∗ − F(p)v
∗]
This is exactly the same lower bound we obtained under order-independence, and the
proof proceeds in the same manner.
The converse to this result does not hold in general. When an order-independent
graph violates weak weighted regularity, it does not follow that ﬁrms necessarily earn
payoﬀs above the max-min level in symmetric equilibrium. For example, recall the
graph given by Figure 2: X = {x,y}, π(x,y)=q and π(y,x)=0 . this graph violates
weak weighted regularity. However, it admits a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which
ﬁrms play a format strategy that satisﬁes λ(x)=
1−q
2−q, and a pricing strategy for which




3+q]. The marginal format strategy is
a max-min strategy for the seeker in the associated hide-and-seek game, and therefore
ﬁrms earn max-min payoﬀs in this equilibrium.
299 Asymmetric Firm Assignment
Equilibrium analysis under order dependence is greatly simpliﬁed if we drop the as-
sumption that the consumer’s initial ﬁrm assignment is symmetric. Suppose that the
consumer is initially assigned to ﬁrm 1, referred to as the Incumbent.F i r m2 is referred
to as the Entrant.I nt h i sc a s e ,ﬁrm 1’s max-min payoﬀ is 1−v∗, while ﬁrm 2’s max-min
payoﬀ is zero.





i=1,2 of the Incumbent-Entrant
model has the following properties:
(i) (λ1,λ 2) constitutes a Nash equilibrium in the associated hide-and-seek game in which
ﬁrm 1 (2)i st h eh i d e r( s e e k e r ) .
(ii) Firm 1’s equilibrium payoﬀ is 1−v∗ while ﬁrm 2’s equilibrium payoﬀ is v∗(1−v∗).










and F1 has an atom of size 1 − v∗ at p =1 .
The simplicity of the equilibrium characterization in this case results from the In-
cumbent’s (Entrant’s) unequivocal incentive to avoid (foster) price comparisons. Each
ﬁrm acts as if it has a ﬁxed role in the hide-and-seek game, independently of the
price it charges. This implies that their pricing decisions are made as if they play an
asymmetric version of the Varian model.
10 Concluding Remarks
This paper studied the implications of limited, format-sensitive comparability for mar-
ket competition. Throughout the paper, we adopted a complexity-based interpretation
of the comparability structure. A format was interpreted as a way of presenting prices,
and the function π measured the “ease of comparison” between price formats. How-
ever, building on Eliaz and Spiegler (2010), we can oﬀer a broader interpretation of the
graph (X,π) and interpret a format as any utility-irrelevant aspect of the product’s
presentation which aﬀects the propensity to make a preference comparison. In partic-
ular, a format can represent an advertising message, a package design or a positioning
30strategy. According to this interpretation, a link from x to y can mean that the format
x reminds the consumer of the format y, or creates mental associations that eventually
lead him to pay attention to any product framed by y.
However, adopting this broader interpretation of formats makes the assumption
that formats are utility-irrelevant less obvious. For example, while the package of a
new product may aﬀect the probability that consumers notice it and thus consider it as
a potential substitute for their default product, consumers may also derive direct utility
from certain aspects of the package design. We are thus led to a comparison between
our limited-comparability approach and conventional models of product diﬀerentiation
(e.g., see Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (1992)). The ﬁrms’ mixing over formats
in Nash equilibrium of our model can be viewed as a type of product diﬀerentiation.
Since in our model the ﬁrms’ product is inherently homogenous, such diﬀerentiation in
f o r m a t si sap u r er e ﬂection of the ﬁrms’ attempt to avoid price comparisons. In conven-
tional models product diﬀerentiation is viewed as the market’s response to consumers’
diﬀerentiated tastes.
To understand the comparison between the two approaches, it may be useful to
think of our model in spatial terms. Suppose that ﬁrms are stores and graph nodes
represent possible physical locations of stores. A link from one location x to another
location y indicates that it is costless to travel from x to y. The absence of a link
from x to y m e a n st h a ti ti si m p o s s i b l et ot r a v e li nt h a td i r e c t i o n .A c c o r d i n gt ot h i s
interpretation, the consumer follows a myopic search process in which he ﬁrst goes
randomly to one of the two stores (independently of their locations). Then, he travels
to the second store if and only if the trip is costless. Finally, the consumer chooses the
cheaper ﬁrm that his search process has elicited (with a tie-breaking rule that favors
the initial ﬁrm).
This re-interpretation is not given here for its realism, but because it is reminiscent
of conventional models of spatial competition. However, there is a crucial diﬀerence. In
conventional models of spatial competition, consumers are attached to speciﬁcl o c a t i o n s
and choose between stores according to their price and the cost of travelling to their
location. In particular, a consumer who is attached to a location x d o e sn o tc a r ea ta l l
about the cost of transportation between two stores if none are located at x. In contrast,
consumer choice in our model is always sensitive to the probability of a link between
the ﬁrms’ locations. In our model consumer choice is typically impossible to rationalize
with a random utility function over pairs (p,x), whereas conventional models of spatial
competition (and product diﬀerentiation in general) are by construction consistent with
a random utility function over price-location pairs.
31Our model and the more conventional spatial-competition analogue are also dif-
ferent at the level of equilibrium predictions. Consider the star graph with q =0 .
The conventional model admits asymmetric equilibria in which ﬁrms adopt diﬀerent
nodes and charge p =1 . In contrast, our model rules out pure-strategy equilibria that
sustain non-competitive outcomes. In addition, it can be shown that the anomalous
comparative statics of equilibrium proﬁts with respect to link strength in bi-symmetric
graphs cannot be reproduced in their conventional spatial-competition analogue.
The two perspectives have very diﬀerent welfare implications. Consider again the
star graph. As the number of peripheral formats m increases, equilibrium proﬁts
rise. Thus, increasing the number of formats has an unambiguously negative eﬀect
on consumer welfare. Conversely, in a standard diﬀerentiated-taste model, increasing
the number of available brands has an ambiguous eﬀect. On one hand, it weakens
competitive forces and thus raises prices (as in our model). On the hand other, it
increases the number of available alternatives and thus raises the maximal utility that
each consumer can obtain. This latter feature is absent from the limited-comparability
perspective.
The two contrasting approaches to product diﬀerentiation can be conveniently in-
tegrated. Suppose that a consumer type θ is characterized by two primitives: a graph
πθ and a willingness-to-pay function uθ : X → {0,1}. The function uθ essentially de-
scribes the set of brands that type θ likes, whereas the graph πθ determines the type’s
ability to compare diﬀerent brands. Exploring this model, and particularly its ability
to account for patterns of consumer behavior, is an interesting challenge for future
work.
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11 Appendix: Proofs
11.1 Proposition 2
Deﬁne XA = {x ∈ X : π(y,x)=1for all y ∈ X}. Suppose that F1 (0) = F2 (0) = 1.
Then, both ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts. If λi (x) > 0 and π(y,x) < 1 for some x ∈ Supp(λi)
and some y ∈ X,t h e nﬁrm j can make positive proﬁts charging p =1and choosing y,
a contradiction. It follows that Supp(λi) ⊆ XA,h e n c eXA is non-empty.
Suppose now that XA is non-empty. If F1 (0) < 1,t h e nﬁrm 2 makes positive
proﬁts. Thus, F2 (0) < 1 and ﬁrm 1 also makes positive proﬁts. We ﬁrst show that it is
impossible that π(x,y)=1for all x ∈ Supp(λ2), y ∈ Supp(λ1). Assume the contrary.
Let ¯ pi denote the supremum of Supp(Fi), and denote ¯ p =m a x (¯ p1, ¯ p2). Without loss of
generality, assume ¯ p =¯ p2.T a k ean o d ez in the support of λ2 such that ¯ p ∈ Supp(Fz
2).











Choosing a price equal to ¯ p − ε and a node x∗ in XA, ﬁrm 2 obtains







1 (¯ p − ε)+( 1− F
x
1 (¯ p − ε)))λ1 (x)
Since ﬁrm 2’s payoﬀ is positive, F
x−
1 (¯ p) < 1 for some x ∈ Supp(F1). But then,
for ε suﬃciently small, the second expression is larger than the ﬁrst expression, a
contradiction.
Now let p∗ be the lowest price p in Supp(F1) ∪ Supp(F2) for which there exist
x ∈ Supp(λj) and y ∈ Supp(λi), i 6= j, such that p ∈ Supp(F
y
i ) and π(x,y) < 1.
If p∗ = pl, then for any y0 ∈ XA, the pure strategy (pl − ε,y0) outperforms the pure
strategy (pl,y),f o rε suﬃciently small, a contradiction. Therefore, p∗ >p l. Without
loss of generality, suppose that p∗ ∈ Supp(F
y

























∗ − ε)+( 1− F
x
1 (p
∗ − ε)))λ1 (x)
By the deﬁnition of p∗,i fF
x−
1 (p∗) > 0,t h e nπ(y,x)=1 .S i n c eπ(x,y) < 1 for some
x ∈ Supp(λ1),f o rε suﬃciently small, the second expression is larger than the ﬁrst
expression, a contradiction.
11.2 Proposition 3
The proof is based on the following version of Farkas’ lemma. Let Ω be an l×m matrix
and b an l-dimensional vector. Then, exactly one of the following two statements is
true: (i) there exists β ∈ Rm such that Ωβ = b and β ≥ 0; (ii) there exists δ ∈ Rl such
that ΩTδ ≥ 0 and bTδ<0.
Suppose that (X,π) is not weighted-regular. Let us ﬁrst show that for every μ ∈







Order the nodes so that X = {1,..,n}.A n y β ∈ ∆(X) is thus represented by a row
vector (β1,...,βn).L e t Π be a n × n matrix whose ijth entry is π(i,j).N o t e t h a t
Π = ΠT.S i n c e(X,π) is not weighted-regular, there exist no β ∈ Rn and c>0 such
that Πβ
T =( c,c,...,c)T. By Farkas’ Lemma, there exists a column vector δ ∈ Rn
such that Πδ ≥ 0 and (c,c,...,c)δ<0.S i n c e π(i,i)=1for every i ∈ {1,...,n} and
π(i,j) ≥ 0 for all i,j ∈ {1,...,n},w ec a nm o d i f yδ into a column vector ˜ δ such that
˜ δi >δ i for every i, Π˜ δ>0 and
P
i˜ δi =0 .L e t μ ∈ ∆(X) and μ(i) > 0 for every
i ∈ {1,...,n}. By the construction of ˜ δ, ˜ μ = μ + α˜ δ is also a probability distribution
over X,f o ras u ﬃciently small α>0.T h e n
Π˜ μ
T = Πμ
T + αΠ˜ δ>Πμ
T
In particular, every component of the vector Π˜ μT is strictly larger than the correspond-
ing component of ΠμT.
By hypothesis, λ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X.W eh a v es h o w nt h a tt h e r ee x i s t sa n o t h e r
format strategy ˜ λ such that every format y ∈ X induces a strictly higher probability
35of a price comparison than λ. This contradicts the assumption that λ is a max-min
strategy for the seeker.
11.3 Proposition 5
Consider a bi-symmetric graph (X,π).D e ﬁne
a =1 + qY (nY − 1) − qnY
b =1 + qZ (nZ − 1) − qnZ





be a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy, and let F denote
the equilibrium marginal pricing strategy. Let Sx denote the support of Fx,a n dl e tpxl
and pxu denote the inﬁmum and supremum of Sx.L e t vx(λ) be the probability that
the consumer makes a price comparison conditional on the event that one ﬁrm adopts






Note that for every x,x0 ∈ Y (similarly, for every x,x0 ∈ Z), vx (λ)=vx0 (λ) if and
only if λ(x)=λ(x0).
The proof relies on a series of lemmas.
Lemma 3 λ(x)=λ(x0) for any x,x0 ∈ Y or x,x0 ∈ Z, i =1 ,2.








x∈Y −(x,y) (1 − Fx (pxu))qYλ(x)+
P
x∈Z (1 − Fx (pxu))qλ(x)+
1
2
(1 − vx (λ))
⎞
⎠







x∈Y −(x,y) (1 − Fx (pxu))qYλ(x)+
P
x∈Z (1 − Fx (pxu))qλ(x)+
1
2
(1 − vy (λ))
⎞
⎠
Since λ(x) >λ (y), v(λ) >v y (λ), hence the deviation is proﬁtable. An analogous
argument for Z establishes the claim.
36Lemma 4 For any p ∈ [pl,1], Fx (p)=Fx0 (p) whenever x,x0 ∈ Y or x,x0 ∈ Z.





(1 − Fy (p))λ(y)+qY
¡




x∈Y −(y,y0) (1 − Fx (p))qYλ(x)+
P
x∈Z (1 − Fx (p))qλ(x)+
1
2
(1 − vy (λ))
⎞
⎠





1 − Fy0 (p)
¢
λ(y)+qY (1 − Fy (p))λ(y)+
P
x∈Y −(y,y0) (1 − Fx (p))qYλ(x)+
P








By Lemma 3, λ(y)=λ(y0) and therefore vy (λ)=vy0 (λ). It follows that the deviation
is proﬁtable.
Lemma 5 λ(x) > 0 for all x ∈ X.
Proof. Suppose that λ(x)=0for some x ∈ Y .B y L e m m a 3 , λ is a uniform
distribution over Z - thus, in particular, λ(y)=0for all y ∈ Y . Therefore, vz (λ)=q∗
Z
for every z ∈ Z and vy (λ)=q for every y ∈ Y .I f q∗
Z 6= q,i tm u s tb ep r o ﬁtable to
deviate either to the pure strategy (1,y) o rt ot h ep u r es t r a t e g y(pl,y).I fq∗
Z = q,t h e n
λ veriﬁes weighted regularity, a contradiction.
Lemma 6 For any y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z, pyu = pzl or pzu = pyl.
Proof. Suppose that vz (λ) <v y (λ). By Lemma 4, the nodes in Y have the same Fy
and the nodes in Z have the same Fz. Therefore, Sy ∩ Sz 6= ∅,f o ra n yy ∈ Y and
z ∈ Z. The following equations must hold in equilibrium.
λ(z)qnZ (1 − Fz (pyu)) +
1
2
(1 − vy (λ)) =
λ(z)(1+qZ (nZ − 1))(1 − Fz (pyu)) +
1
2
(1 − vz (λ))
λ(z)qnZ +( 1+qY (nY − 1))λ(y)
¡¡





(1 − vy (λ)) =
λ(z)(1+qZ (nZ − 1)) + qnYλ(y)
¡¡
















vz (λ) − vy (λ)
2
Hence, b<0. Since the graph is not weighted-regular, a>0. It can be easily veriﬁed
that the above equations hold only if Fz (pyu)=0and Fy ¡
pzl¢
=1 .I fvz (λ) >v y (λ),
a symmetric argument establishes the claim.
By Lemmas 5 and 6, a symmetric Nash equilibrium must be a cutoﬀ equilibrium.
Moreover, by Lemma 4, it suﬃces to consider two cases: either λ
[pm,1] is a uniform
distribution over Y and λ
[pl,pm] is a uniform distribution over Z,o rλ
[pm,1] is a uniform
distribution over Z and λ
[pl,pm] is a uniform distribution over Y .T o p i n d o w n t h e
format strategy λ, we use the equilibrium condition that ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between
playing y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z at the cutoﬀ price pm (pm = pzu = pyl in the former case,
and pm = pzl = pyu in the latter case).












for arbitrary y ∈ Y and z ∈ Z.S i n c eq∗
Y <q<q ∗
Z, the latter case is ruled out, and the
former equation yields λ.
11.4 Proposition 7
(i) Whenever p1 ≤ p2, the consumer chooses ﬁrm 1 with probability one. Whenever
p1 >p 2, the consumer chooses ﬁrm 2 if and only if he makes a price comparison.
Therefore, for every price p that lies strictly above the inﬁmum of Supp(F2), ﬁrm
1’s optimal formats minimize v(·,λ
[pl,p]
2 ). Similarly, for every price p that lies strictly
below the supremum of Supp(F1), ﬁrm 2’s optimal formats maximize v(λ
[p,1]
1 ,·).B y
standard arguments, the closure of both Supp(F1) and Supp(F2) is [pl,1],w h e r epl > 0.
Therefore, ﬁrm 1’s format strategy conditional on p>p l and ﬁrm 2’s format strategy
conditional on p<1 constitute a Nash equilibrium in the associated hide-and-seek
game. These format strategies are equal to the ﬁrms’ marginal equilibrium format
38strategies, because as we will verify below, F1 does not have an atom on pl and F2 does
not have an atom on p =1 .
(ii) Since p =1is in the support of F1 and ﬁrm 2’s format strategy conditional on
p<1 max-minimizes v, ﬁrm 1’s equilibrium payoﬀ is 1 − v∗.S i n c e ﬁrm 1 is chosen
with probability one when it charges pl, it follows that pl =1− v∗. But since ﬁrm 1’s
format strategy conditional on p>p l min-maximizes v, it follows that ﬁrm 2’s payoﬀ
is v∗ · (1 − v∗).
(iii) The formulas of F1 and F2 follow directly from the condition that every
p ∈ (1 − v∗,1) maximizes each ﬁrm’s proﬁt given the opponent’s strategy, and the
characterization of ﬁrm 1’s format strategy conditional on p>p l and ﬁrm 2’s format
strategy conditional on p<1.
39